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Pennsylvania's Voluntary Confession
Amendment: Majoritarian Control of
Fundamental Rights
I. Introduction
At the general election on November 6, 1984, "the people" of
Pennsylvania twice amended the state constitution. Pennsylvanians
have now altered that document seventeen times since 1968, when it
became effective as the state's fifth fundamental charter of govern-
ment.1 The two most recent changes illustrate the wide range of
state governmental activity subject to the frequently invoked amend-
ment process. One of the changes concerns local taxing authority,'
the most typical kind of state constitutional reform." The other
touches a more controversial topic. By voting to allow the use of oth-
erwise suppressed voluntary confessions to impeach the credibility of
criminal defendants on the witness stand, the people of Pennsylvania
have decided to narrow significantly the privilege against self-incrim-
ination under article I, section 9 of the state constitution,4 as con-
strued by the state's highest court. 5 Opponents of the amendment
I. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1984-1985 221 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as BOOK OF THE STATES]. The Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968 did
not create an entirely new document, as the conventions of 1776, 1790, 1838 and 1873 did.
The people had approved only a limited convention, with authority to make.,revisions in four
general areas: legislative apportionment; judicial administration, organization, selection and
tenure; local government; and taxation and state finance. PREPARATORY COMM. OF THE PA.
CONST'L CONVENTION, THE CONVENTION 15 (1967).
2. H.R.J. Res. 2, 1982 Pa. Laws 1478.
3. Of the 149 state constitutional amendments adopted during the 1982-1983 bien-
nium, one-third involved taxation and finance matters. In all, 74 of these proposals appeared
on the ballots. BooK OF THE STATES, supra note I, at 214-16.
4. Article I, section 9, as amended, provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and
his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he cannot be compelled to give
evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property,
unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. The use of a sup-
pressed voluntary admission or voluntary confession to impeach the credibility
of a person may be permitted and shall not be construed as compelling a person
to give evidence against himself.
S.J. Res. 2, 168th Reg. Sess., 1984 Pa. Legis. Serv. No. 6, A-I (Purdon) (emphasis in
original).
5. In Commonwealth v. Triplett, 464 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975), the Supreme
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argue that specific application of broad constitutional principles, par-
ticularly in the area of individual rights, is best left to the judiciary.
They fear that, in the words of one Pennsylvania legislative analyst,
"this is only the first skirmish in an all-out war on the rights of ac-
cused persons." 6
Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution, however, also de-
clares that all power "is inherent in the people, and all free govern-
ments are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace,
safety and happiness." Therefore, "the people" have "at all times an
inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their
government in such a manner as they may think proper."7 Undoubt-
edly, the adoption of the voluntary confession amendment was a per-
missible exercise of the people's sovereign power. But even so, it
raises problems touching the often uneasy balance of power upon
which the American constitutional system depends. The most critical
issue concerns the conflicting purposes of the state constitution in a
representative democracy. 8 On the one hand, the constitution should
preserve inviolate those individual rights which have become, in the
evolution of Anglo-American law, the cornerstones of a free society;9
on the other, the state constitution in particular should reflect, to the
greatest extent possible, the popular will.' 0
This comment examines the background and effect of the volun-
tary confession amendment, with particular emphasis on the emer-
gence of state constitutional jurisprudence. It analyzes the amend-
ment in light of recent political trends and in terms of basic legal
and political theory. It concludes that although the general assembly
and the electorate acted legally, the assembly nonetheless committed
a political indiscretion by invoking the majoritarian amendment pro-
Court of Pennsylvania held that tainted voluntary confessions are inadmissible for impeach-
ment purposes. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
6. Pa. L.J. Rep., Nov. 19, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
7. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
8. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
9. "We think it fundamental in our theory of constitutional government that the basic
purpose of a written constitution has a two-fold aspect, first, the securing to the people of
certain unchangeable rights and remedies, and, second, the curtailment of unrestricted govern-
mental activity within certain defined fields." DuPont v. DuPont, 32 Del. Ch. 413, 85 A.2d
724, 728 (1951). See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533 (1883) (written constitu-
tions essential to preservation of fundamental rights).
10. "[A constitution] is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private
rights; it is not the fountain of the law, nor the incipient state of government; it is not the
cause, but consequence, of personal and political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but
is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience." T. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 37 (reprint ed. 1972) (quoting Hamilton v. St. Louis
County Ct., 15 Mo. 5, 13 (1851)). The populist view of state constitutions stems largely from
"early twentieth century progressivism." Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct
Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, II HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 47 (1983);
see generally W. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910)
(progressive era legal scholar urging use of amendment process as means of popular control of
government).
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cess in this case.
II. The Background
A. Suppressed Confessions Under the Fifth Amendment: Harris v.
New York
In 1971, a closely divided United States Supreme Court held, in
Harris v. New York," that a prosecutor can impeach the credibility
of a defendant on the witness stand by using statements acquired in
violation of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.
Many observers, including three of the four dissenting Justices, con-
sidered Harris a substantial retreat from the Court's earlier con-
struction of the fifth amendment in Miranda v. Arizona."2 Harris
had given an apparently voluntary confession following his arrest,
but the police had failed to inform him of his right to counsel as
required under Miranda. When he later took the stand on his own
behalf, some of his testimony contradicted his post-arrest confession.
The trial judge allowed the state to introduce evidence of the confes-
sion for impeachment purposes. Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Burger acknowledged that the state could not use tainted evi-
dence during its case-in-chief, but concluded that "the shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to commit
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with
prior inconsistent utterances."' Is An overwhelming majority of state
courts have applied the Harris rationale without considering the pos-
sibility of separate state constitutional analysis.'
B. The Independence of Pennsylvania Constitutional Jurispru-
dence: Triplett and Beyond
1. The Triplett Case.-Until recently, Pennsylvania was
among the minority of states that rejected Harris.'6 In Common-
wealth v. Triplett,6 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
II. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In his Harris dissent, Justice Brennan claimed that the ma-
jority had undermined the two great objectives of the privilege against self-incrimination, as
construed in Miranda: (1) "safeguarding the integrity of our judicial system;" and (2) "deter-
ring improper police conduct." Harris, 401 U.S. at 231-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13. Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
14. See, e.g, Hall v. State, 292 Md. 683, 441 A.2d 708 (1982); People v. Wise, 46
N.Y.2d 321, 385 N.E.2d 1262, 413 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1978); State v. Johnson, 109 Ariz. 70, 505
P.2d 241 (1973); People v. Moore, 54 111. 2d 33, 294 N.E.2d 297 (1973); Johnson v. State, 258
Ind. 683, 284 N.E.2d 517 (1972); State v. Falco, 60 N.J. 570, 292 A.2d 13 (1972); State v.
Kassow, 28 Ohio St. 2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 435 (1971).
15. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1976); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d
190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (relying on statutory rule).
16. 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975).
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under article I, section 9 of the state constitution,1 7 which substan-
tially mirrors the language of the fifth amendment,' 8 tainted volun-
tary confessions are inadmissible even for impeachment purposes.
The court offered scant reasoning for its decision, noting only that a
defendant should not have to make the "grisly Hobson's choice" be-
tween his right to testify on his own behalf and his right not to have
illegally obtained statements used against him.' 9 Two Justices dis-
sented, but only one, Chief Justice Jones, argued that the Harris
rationale should apply in Pennsylvania.2
2. Emergence of Pennsylvania Constitutional Jurispru-
dence.-The Triplett case was the harbinger of a trend in Pennsyl-
vania constitutional law decisions. On numerous occasions over the
past ten years, Pennsylvania courts have held that the state constitu-
tion provides greater protection of individual rights than the United
State Supreme Court has recognized under the federal constitu-
tion. 21 Confronted with Burger Court decisions that have narrowed
and restricted earlier interpretations of the Bill of Rights, state
courts have increasingly recognized the independence of state consti-
tutions within the federal system. Accordingly, an entire body of
17. See supra note 4.
18. The fifth amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. Triplett, 462 Pa. at 249, 341 A.2d at 64 (quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 455
Pa. 1, 7, 312 A.2d 357, 360 (1973) (Roberts, J., concurring)).
20. Chief Justice Jones expressed the further view that the Harris rationale should
apply to involuntary confessions as well as voluntary ones. The defendant would then have the
opportunity on re-direct examination to rehabilitate himself by showing the circumstances
under which the confession was obtained. Id. at 256, 341 A.2d at 68 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
21. Commonwealth v. Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 454 A.2d 537 (1982) presents another self-
incrimination case. The Turner court held that article 1, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
does not allow the Commonwealth to impeach a defendant with the fact that he remained
silent after his arrest. The ruling expressly rejected the contrary decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982). See also Commonwealth v. Tate,
495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981) (free speech); Commonwealth v. Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404
A.2d 1309 (1979) (waiver of Miranda rights); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403
A.2d 1283 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980) (search and seizure of bank records);
Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974) (right to counsel at pre-indict-
ment line-up); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973) (double
jeopardy).
22. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977) (Justice Brennan notes "a trend in recent opinions of the United
States Supreme Court to pull back from, or at least suspend for the time being," active en-
forcement of individual rights). "We have not hesitated when we concluded that the Federal
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court fell short of adequate protection for our
citizens to rely upon the principle that that document defines the minimum level of individual
rights and leaves the states free to provide greater rights for its citizens through its Constitu-
tion, statutes or rule-making authority." Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 79, 399 N.E.2d
state constitutional jurisprudence has evolved over the past decade,
with an emphasis on criminal procedure. 3 Pennsylvania has taken
significant part in this development.
Since Triplett, Pennsylvania decisions have become more so-
phisticated in their interpretation of the state charter. For example,
in Commonwealth v. Sell,24 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
jected the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in United States
v. Salvucci2' and held that a defendant has "automatic standing" to
challenge, as a violation of the prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure, the admissibility of evidence in which the defen-
dant had an ownership or possessory interest.
Sell presents a truly independent Pennsylvania approach to con-
stitutional analysis.26 The majority, relied heavily on Pennsylvania
history and precedent to construe the search and seizure provisions
of the Pennsylvania constitution. It noted that the "constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures existed in
Pennsylvania more than a decade before the adoption of the federal
Constitution, and fifteen years prior to the promulgation of the
Fourth Amendment.
' 27
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently applied a similar
analysis to the same constitutional provision in Commonwealth v.
1188, 1193, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 174 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980). See also People
v. Rucker, 26 Cal. 3d 368, 605 P.2d 843, 162 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1980) ("privilege against self-
incrimination in the California Constitution is at least as broad, and often broader, than that
accorded by the federal Constitution"); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982)
(search and seizure); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (equal protection
right to education).
23. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729
(1976). The field of state constitutional jurisprudence has inspired an avalanche of mostly
insightful commentary. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 22; Collins, Reliance on State Constitu-
tions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); Countryman,
Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970); Douglas, State Judicial Activ-
ism-The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123 (1978); Falk,
Forward-The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF.
L. REV. 273 (1973); Fischer, supra note 1i; Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect
and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. UL. REV. 125 (1969); Galie & Galie, State Constitu-
tional Guarantees and Supreme Court Review: Justice Marshall's Proposal in Oregon v.
Hass, 82 DicK. L. REv. 273 (1978); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the
Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional
Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984); Linde, First Things First: Rediscover-
ing the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 299 (1978); Wilkes, The New Federalism
in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974).
24. 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983).
25. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
26. Ledewitz, Pennsylvania Law. The State Constitution Assumes New Importance,
Pa. L.J.-Rep., Nov. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
27. Sell, 504 Pa. at 63, 470 A.2d at 466. Chief Justice Nix noted the similarity of
language between the current state search and seizure provision and the one embodied in
Pennsylvania's first constitution. He concluded that "the survival of the language now em-
ployed in Article I, section 8 through over 200 years of profound change in other areas demon-
strates that the paramount concern for privacy first adopted as part of our organic law in 1776
continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of this Commonwealth." Id. at 65, 470 A.2d at
467.
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Beauford.8 The court concluded that police use of a pen register, a
device that records the numbers dialed from a telephone unit without
intercepting any conversation, violates the state prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Beauford decision expressly
contravenes Smith v. Maryland,29 in which the United States Su-
preme Court held that the use of pen registers does not violate the
fourth amendment. By a unanimous panel, the court incorporated
Pennsylvania constitutional history, case precedent, statutory provi-
sions and legislative history into its exposition of article I, section 8.
Thus, unlike the Triplett court, the Beauford court did more than
merely reject the Supreme Court's reasoning in favor of its own. It
went on to conclude that its "constitutional interpretation derives in-
dependent support from Pennsylvania's long history of affording spe-
cial protection to the privacy interest inherent in a telephone call."30
Both Sell and Beauford illustrate the many recent cases in which
Pennsylvania courts have sought to develop and explain the founda-
tions of Pennsylvania constitutional law. 8
Sell further demonstrates that although Pennsylvania courts in
the past have adhered to federal precedent on a particular matter of
constitutional interpretation, they need not continue to do so. For
twenty years, Pennsylvania followed the lead of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Jones"2 on the issue of automatic
standing. When the Supreme Court effectively overruled Jones in its
Salvucci decision, the Sell court chose to remain with Jones. After a
long discussion of federal precedent, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court concluded that Jones more accurately reflected the Pennsylva-
nia view of automatic standing in search and seizure cases.83
C. The Legislature Reacts: Debates in the Senate
When the public believes that defendants accused of heinous ac-
tivity have slipped through constitutional loopholes to escape appro-
priate sanctions, attacks on the judiciary and the exclusionary rule
resound from all corners.3 ' Thus, in 1981, Senator Stewart Green-
leaf," with the close cooperation of Philadelphia District Attorney
28. 327 Pa. Super. 253, 475 A.2d 783 (1984) (panel).
29. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
30. Beauford, 327 Pa. Super. at 267, 475 A.2d at 790.
31. See supra note 21; Ledewitz, supra note 26.
32. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
33. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has relied more than once on overruled federal
decisions to bolster its own state constitutional analysis. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hender-
son, 496 Pa. 349, 437 A.2d 387 (1981) (upholding "interested adult" rule in juvenile cases
despite its elimination in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)).
34. See, e.g., Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HASTINGS
L.J. 1065 (1982) (noting popular opposition to exclusionary rule); Mathias, The Exclusionary
Rule Revisited, 28 Loy. L. REV. 1 (1982) (discussing proposals in Congress to eliminate rule).
35. The Senator is a two-term Republican from Montgomery County. He is also chair-
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Ed Rendell, proposed to the Pennsylvania General Assembly a con-
stitutional amendment designed to overrule the Triplett decision and
align Pennsylvania with the Harris majority.3 6
1. The Amendment Procedure.-Article XI of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution requires that a proposed amendment pass two con-
secutive sessions of the General Assembly before the assembly can
submit it to the electorate for ratification.3 7 The constitution also
mandates extensive publication of the proposed amendment after
each passage. 6 Designed to stimulate debate and reflection, the pub-
lication requirement nevertheless drew scant public attention to the
voluntary confession amendment. The proposal easily passed the ses-
sions of. 1982 and 1984,11 despite opposition by the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Philadelphia Bar Association and many mem-
bers of the criminal defense bar,40 and despite vigorous debates on
the floor of the Senate.4'
2. The Debates.-Supporters in the Senate naturally charac-
terized the voluntary confession amendment as an anti-crime mea-
sure, intended to keep dangerous criminals off the streets and to pro-
hibit "legalized perjury" in Pennsylvania courts. Illustrating the
"need" for the amendment, Senator Greenleaf described a case in
which the jury acquitted a defendant charged with the rape of a
fourteen-year-old girl.' 3 According to the Senator, the defendant had
previously confessed to the crime, but, because of an absence of pro-
cedural safeguards, the court suppressed his statement. When the
defendant denied his guilt on the witness stand, the court, following
Triplett, did not allow the prosecutor to use the suppressed confes-
man of the Senate Committee on Law and Justice.
36. 1981 PA. SENATE LEGIS. J. 790 (remarks of Sen. Greenleaf); 1983 PA. SENATE
LEGIS, J. 196-97 (remarks of Sen. Greenleaf).
37. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
38. If the amendment proposal passes the first assembly, the Secretary of the Common-
wealth must have it published three months before the next general election in at least two
newspapers in each county. The same publication rule applies if the amendment passes the
next assembly. Id. The constitution also provides for an expedited amendment procedure "in
the event a major emergency threatens or is about to threaten the Commonwealth." Id. § I (a).
39. During the 1983-84 session, the proposal passed in the Senate by a vote of 35 to 10,
1983 PA. SENATE LEGIS. J, at 202, and in the House 193 to 2, 1984 PA. HousE LEGis. J.. 1777-
78. During the 1981-82 session, it passed in the Senate 35 to 12, 1981 PA. SENATE LEGIS. J.
792, and in the House 191 to 6, 1982 PA. HOUSE LEGiS. J. 116.
40. See Pa. L.J.-Rep., Nov. 19, 1984, at 2, col. 3; Pa. L.J.-Rep., July 16, 1984, at 10,
col. 3. According to Senator Greenleaf, the proposal had the support of the Pennsylvania Dis-
trict Attorneys Association, the Philadelphia District Attorney's office and the Philadelphia
Chiefs of Police Association. 1983 PA. SENATE LEGIS. J. 197 (remarks of Sen. Greenleaf).
41. See 1983 PA. SENATE LEGIS. J. 193-202. Senator Zemprelli noted, "It has been a
long time since I have been privileged to hear the quality of debate that has taken place on this
very important issue." Id. at 197.
42. 1983 PA. SENATE LEGIS. J. 194-96 (remarks of Sen. Greenleaf).
43. Id. at 194.
sion for impeachment. Proponents of the amendment argued that the
court's interpretation of article I, section 9 of the constitution failed
to protect the people. Therefore, they looked to the General Assem-
bly to conform the law to the popular will.
4"
Senators who opposed the proposal expressed concern at the use
of the amendment process to alter fundamental liberties. Some ar-
gued that "the Constitution of Pennsylvania and the Constitution of
the United States are supposed to be basic documents which have
broad statements of principles of law and are the foundations of our
governments."45 Therefore, legislative bodies threaten the constitu-
tional system when they seek to tinker with the constitution "every
time they disagree with the interpretation of the Supreme Court."' "6
Senator Williams added that the guarantees of the state Declaration
of Rights and the federal Bill of Rights protect minority groups
against the majoritarian processes of government.47 Other opponents
argued that the amendment amounted to nothing more than a politi-
cal overreaction and that the general assembly was merely attempt-
ing to lay the blame upon the judiciary for its own deficiencies in the
law enforcement area. 8 In their view, by failing to recognize the
importance of the rights at stake and the role of the court as inter-
preter of those rights, the Assembly would "throw the baby out with
the bath water."
4 9
44. When the proposed amendment came up for final consideration, Senator Bell noted:
I do not think the Constitution is sacred like the Holy Bible. I think it is a living
document and, for it to remain a living document, it must be flexible. When the
people are so incensed by actions of our Court, their only recourse is to the
legislative Body whether it is State or National and to cast the mote out of the
eye. . . . I am convinced that those judges are still humans and humans err.
Therefore, the only recourse the offended people have against court decisions is
through the legislative process, through the amendments. Therefore, I say if this
matter offends the people of Pennsylvania, take the constitutional amendment
process.
Id. (remarks of Sen. Bell).
45. Id. at 193-94 (remarks of Sen. Scanlon).
46. Id. Senator Scanlon also argued that personal or emotional disagreement with court
decisions does not constitute a valid reason for amending a constitution. He noted, as exam-
ples, recent attempts to amend the United States Constitution to forbid abortion and to allow
school prayer. Id. at 193.
47. "i do not want any of you people speaking for the [minority] to send one innocent
person to jail just to satisfy a political point." Id. at 199 (Remarks of Senator Williams).
48. Senator Williams, in particular, urged that the assembly and the United States
Congress assume more responsibility for the conduct of law enforcement activity and the effec-
tive administration of the criminal justice system. He suggested that the legislatures demand
an accounting from the district attorneys, police and judges to whom they allocated funds. Id.
at 199.
49. Id. at 198 (remarks of Sen. Zemprelli). On the role of the courts, Senator Williams
noted:
But I suggest to you that the etching away [of constitutional rights] because we
want to take a pot shot at judges only indicates that we do not want to assume
our responsibility as Legislators, and leave to [the courts] the job of interpreta-
tion of a Constitution, an extremely tough, sensitive and responsible role in our
society where we have three branches of government.
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In the end, the proposed amendment passed the 1984 session in
time for the Assembly to submit it to the electorate on the Novem-
ber ballot. Unfortunately, a relatively small percentage of voters an-
swered the two constitutional ballot questions.50 In fact, a study con-
ducted by Shippensburg State University revealed that only twenty
percent felt they could respond intelligently to the ballot issues."1
Nonetheless, nearly fifty-nine percent of those who did vote on the
voluntary confession amendment approved of it.52
III. Majority Rule and Individual Rights
Unlike the United States Constitution, most state charters pro-
vide for some kind of majoritarian amendment process.53 Pennsylva-
nia is no exception. This leaves state constitutions open to the dan-
gers of what James Madison called "faction."' In his famous
defense of the federal constitution, Madison argued that "the public
good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and ...mea-
sures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and
the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an inter-
ested and overbearing majority."55 At the heart of American consti-
tutional theory, then, lies the belief that an unrestrained government,
even in the form of a direct democracy, is inherently at odds with
the protection of basic rights. 6 The United States Supreme Court
Id. at 196 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
50. Pennsylvania has a population of 11,863,895. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1,
at 530. In 1984, 6,193,702 Pennsylvanians were registered to vote, and 4,845,903 actually
voted for one of the Presidential candidates. In sharp contrast, only 2,618,485 voted on the
proposed voluntary confession amendment-less than 54 percent of the total votes cast for
President and less than 22 percent of the total population. Telephone interview with records
clerk, Board of Elections, Pennsylvania Department of State (Jan. 4, 1985).
51. The study was conducted before the general election. Pa. L.J.-Rep., Nov. 19, 1984,
at 2, col. 2-3.
52. A total of 1,542,142 voted for the amendment, and 1,076,343 voted against it.
Telephone interview with records clerk, Board of Elections, Pennsylvania Department of State
(Jan. 4, 1985).
53. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 223. The constitutions of New York
and New Jersey establish amendment procedures substantially similar to Pennsylvania's, that
is, passage by a majority of two successive legislatures and then ratification by a majority of
the electorate. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § I; N.J. CONST. art. IX, § 1. The Constitution of
Maryland, on the other hand, is less majoritarian. It requires passage by three-fifths of the
legislature before submission to the electorate. MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. The most permissive
procedures are those that provide for amendment by popular initiative. These schemes typi-
cally allow a small percentage of the electorate, rather than the legislature, to propose amend-
ments. See, e.g., OHIo CONST. art. 1, § 1 (10 percent of the electorate); CALIF. CONST. art. II,
§ 8(b) (8 percent of the total number of votes cast in the last gubernatorial election).
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54 (J. Madison) (Bicentennial ed. 1976). "By a fac-
tion, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, ad-
verse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the commu-
nity." id.
55. Id.
56. Pure democracies "have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have
ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in
has held repeatedly that even the most discrete and insular minori-
ties hold certain "fundamental" rights against the will of the politi-
cally dominant majority.5 7 The members of the First Congress cer-
tainly had this idea in mind when they framed the federal Bill of
Rights in 1790. The first ten amendments would, in Madison's
words, "expressly declare the great rights of mankind" and operate
"sometimes against the abuse of the executive power, sometimes
against the legislative, and, in some cases, against the community
itself, or, in other words, against the majority in favor of the minor-
ity."'58 The theory of "great" or "basic" or "fundamental" rights,
however, creates a problem at the state level: the majoritarian
amendment process appears inconsistent with preservation of state
constitutional guarantees.
The problem becomes particularly acute when a "hot" political
issue has the potential to stir majority sentiment and fuel voter in-
tensity. Generally, ballot propositions concerning criminal justice,
race relations, and other civil liberties and civil rights fall into the
"hot" political issue category. 59 Politicians can easily incorporate this
type of issue into the seductive rhetoric of political campaigns. Thus,
the elimination of constitutional "loopholes" or "technicalities" cre-
ated by "criminal-coddling" state judiciaries becomes part of the
candidate's anti-crime stance. Under these conditions, the rights of
political minorities are most vulnerable.
IV. The Effect of the Current Political Climate on Criminal Jus-
tice: America's "Swing to the Right."
The United States has undergone an apparent swing to the po-
litical right in recent years."0 At the national level, the current ad-
general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." Id. at 58. Many
of the Founders profoundly feared the majoritarian excesses of most democracies, particularly
in light of the bloody French Revolution. See, e.g., J. ADAMS, Letters to John Taylor of Caro-
lina, Virginia, in 6 WORKS 484 (C. Adams ed. 1851) (democracies, "when unchecked, produce
the same effects of fraud, violence, and cruelty" as aristocracies or monarchies).
57. In the now-famous "Carolene Products footnote," Chief Justice Stone first enunci-
ated the idea that the rights of politically powerless minorities may require a greater degree of
judicial protection. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938).
58. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (J.-Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep. Madison) (emphasis
added).
59. See Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience,
Public Choice and the First Amendment, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 505 (1982) (exhaustive study of
California ballot propositions indicating. that voter intensity and media attention most signifi-
cant factors in determination of civil rights-related ballot issues). "State constitutional juris-
prudence has met with consistent majoritarian rejection where that jurisprudence involved in-
creased rights for criminal defendants-hardly a group for which there is much popular
sympathy. Crime is an issue that usually ranks high in polls on voter concerns." Fischer, supra
note 10, at 78.
60. See Stacks, It's Rightward On, TIME, June 1, 1981, at 12 (results of poll indicating
increase in conservatism in America).
ministration has brought "law and order"to the forefront of its con-
servative agenda. Former Attorney General William French Smith
repeatedly denounced judicial activism in the criminal procedure
area and called for elimination of the exclusionary rule.61 The ap-
pointment of conservative Supreme Court justices by Presidents
Nixon, Ford and Reagan has caused the Court to edge away from
the activism of the Warren era. 2 In keeping with this political cli-
mate, the High Court's decisions have increasingly deferred to police
and prosecutorial activity.
The new conservatism has also affected criminal justice at the
state level. Many governors and legislatures have adopted a hard line
against crime, supporting increased expenditures for prison construc-
tion, district attorneys, and law enforcement.63 In some instances,
the trend has surfaced in the form of state constitutional amend-
ments. California, for example, added a "Victim's Bill of Rights" to
the state constitution in 1982.64 The Bill established, among other
things, the victim's right to restitution from the wrongdoer, the right
to have all relevant evidence admitted in criminal proceedings, and
the right to safe schools. It also placed restrictions on the accused's
right to bail and provided for unlimited use of prior convictions for
purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence. Also in 1982,
Floridians approved an amendment that effectively eliminated the
state constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.15 Voters in other states, often in opposition to their state
supreme courts, have approved measures to restore the death pen-
alty, to restrict the right of bail, and to recognize the right to keep
and bear arms."
Although Pennsylvania's voluntary confession amendment is
unique, it follows the general swing to the right in the criminal pro-
cedure area. The legislative history of the amendment proposal
61. See Smith, Is It Time to Change the Exclusionary Rule?, L.A. Daily J., Mar. I,
1983, at 4, col. 5. Other members of the Reagan Administration have expressed similar views.
See, e.g., Robinson, Exclusion Rule High on Reagan's 'Hit List', Nat'l L.J., Aug. 10, 1981, at
21, cot. 1 (general overview of administration policy); Brauchli, From the Woolsack, 12 COLO.
LAW. 1098 (1983) (Presidential Counsel, now Attorney General, Edwin Meese denounces ex-
clusionary rule).
62. See Gest, A Turn to the Right by the Burger Court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 16, 1984, at 33; see also R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979) (de-
tailed discussion of Nixon and Ford appointees and their effect on the Court).
63. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at A-I, col. 6 (reporting recent budget pro-
posals by governor of New York).
64. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28.
65. The amendment expressly equates Florida's guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures with the fourth amendment guarantee, as construed by the United States
Supreme Court. Thus, it eliminates any independent state constitutional analysis. See FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 12.
66. For a discussion of recent developments, see BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note I, at
214-15.
reveals that its supporters intended it primarily as a means of crack-
ing down on criminals.6 Encouraged by the political success of the
measure, the attack on procedural safeguards will most likely spread
in Pennsylvania, as it has elsewhere. Senator Greenleaf, sponsor of
the voluntary confession amendment, already introduced an amend-
ment to allow the jury in a criminal case to render a verdict by only
five-sixth of its members, as in civil cases. 68 In addition, Philadelphia
District Attorney Rendell has proposed that the state, as well as the
defendant, should have the right to request a jury trial.69
V. Legal Theories on the Propriety of the Voluntary Confession
Amendment
Very few legal constraints upon the state constitutional amend-
ment process exist. Generally, they derive from two sources: (1) the
state constitution itself; and (2) federal law, particularly the United
States Constitution. 0
A. Procedural Limitations
Every state constitution expressly provides for its own amend-
ment.71 Some of them, particularly those providing for amendment
by popular initiative, place detailed procedural restrictions on the
process. The Ohio Constitution, for example, requires court supervi-
sion in some circumstances to ensure fairness and comprehensibility
of constitutional ballot questions. 2 It also requires publication of two
court-approved essays discussing the proposed amendment. While
one essay will urge adoption of the proposal, the other must present
opposing views.73 Amendment procedures under other state constitu-
tions are considerably less complicated. All, however, require strict
67. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
68. S. 243, 167th Reg. Sess. (1983) (referred to Judiciary Committee, Feb. 8, 1983).
69. Pa. L.J.-Rep., Nov. 19, 1984, at 2, col. 3. To date, however, almost all of the nu-
merous amendment proposals pending before the General Assembly concern matters outside
the realm of criminal justice. Of the 84 amendment proposals under various stages of consider-
ation in the General Assembly during the 1983-84 session, only one related directly to criminal
justice. See PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 167TH & 168TH REG. SESS., COMBINED HISTORY OF SENATE
AND HOUSE BILLS V-100 to V-104 (1984).
70. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2. Thus, federal constitutional constraints apply to state constitutional
as well as statutory provisions. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
(state constitution viewed as state statute for purposes of invoking Supreme Court jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976)).
71. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 223-29.
72. OHIO CONST. art. II, § Ig. The same requirements pertain to amendments proposed
by the legislature. Id. art. XVI, § 1.
73. Id. art. I, § 1g.
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compliance.74
In Stander v. Kelley,7 5 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that failure to abide by the amendment procedures of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution, article XI, would render an amendment void even
though a majority of the electorate adopted it. For example, Article
XI, Section I requires the Secretary of State to publish a proposed
amendment in at least two newspapers in every city within a speci-
fied time period. Under the Stander rationale, if the Secretary failed
to do so, the amendment would not survive an attack grounded in
article XI even if adopted by an overwhelming majority of voters.
Nonetheless, the voluntary confession amendment raises no apparent
state constitutional objections on procedural grounds.
B. Due Process Limitations on the Amendment Process
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion,76 any form of federal law, even federal agency regulations,
takes precedence over any form of state law, including state constitu-
tions. The most common federal limitations on state law, however,
arise from the United States Constitution itself."" Thus, a state con-
stitutional amendment that expressly denies a public education to
members of a particular racial minority would undoubtedly violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.78 The state
amendment, therefore, would lack all force and effect.
Although the voluntary confession amendment presents no
equal protection problem, its adoption does raise questions under the
fourteenth amendment's nebulous due process standards. One ques-
tion involves the possibility that a large percentage of Pennsylvania
voters failed to comprehend the meaning or purpose of the amend-
ment. 9 Another involves the notion that defendants on trial in Penn-
sylvania courts have acquired a vested right to the procedural protec-
tions established in Triplett.
1. Voidness Due to Incomprehensibility.-Excessive length,
74. See, e.g., Hyder v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 138, 236 S.E.2d 561 (1977) (amendment of
state constitution must strictly comply with constitutional provisions); Johnson v. Duke, 180
Md. 434, 24 A.2d 304 (1942) (judicial duty to uphold integrity of fundamental law by ensur-
ing that changes conform with constitutional procedures); Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99
N.E. I (1912) (amendment process must comply with particular provisions of federal and state
constitutions); But cf. State ex rel. Smith v. Kelly, 149 W. Va. 381, 141 S.E.2d 142 (1965)
(substantial compliance with state constitutional amendment procedures is sufficient).
75. 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474 (1969), appeal dismissed 395 U.S. 827 (1970).
76. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See supra note 70.
77. See Fischer, supra note 10, at 59-72.
78. The United States Supreme Court has long held that, under the fourteenth amend-
ment, a state cannot deny a person equal educational opportunities because of race. See Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79. See supra notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text.
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vagueness or complexity in a proposed constitutional amendment
may violate the tenets of due process. 80 According to a recent Flor-
ida Supreme Court decision, due process requires that amendment
propositions "be fair and advise the voter sufficiently to enable him
intelligently to cast his ballot."' A majority should not deprive a
minority of important rights unless it fully understands the magni-
tude of its action.
As the Shippensburg State University voter study82 indicates,
the vast majority of Pennsylvania voters felt unable to respond intel-
ligently on either of the two recent ballot questions. Perhaps this
lack of understanding explains the low level of voter participation.
The total votes cast on the voluntary confession amendment consti-
tuted less than fifty-four percent of the total votes cast for President
of the United States and just over forty-two percent of the total reg-
istered voters in Pennsylvania.8
Any difficulty in comprehension arises more from the nature of
the amendment than its particular language. For a layperson to
grasp the meaning of the amendment, he would need at least some
familiarity with such legal niceties as the circumstances under which
a court suppresses evidence, the difference between impeachment ev-
idence and evidence of guilt, and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. In the detached judicial atmosphere of the courtroom, a compe-
tent trial judge could make these concepts clear to a jury. But
amidst the slogans, rhetoric and other distractions of a general elec-
tion, particularly a Presidential election, the voter has little opportu-
nity for investigation and mature reflection on constitutional
principle.
Thus, an overly complex amendment also leads to the possibility
that under-informed voters, if they choose to vote on the ballot pro-
positions at all, will rely too heavily on misleading campaign propa-
ganda.8 4 Even in the relatively deliberative atmosphere of the Penn-
sylvania Senate chamber, supporters argued that the voluntary
confession amendment would protect the citizens of Pennsylvania
against those who, in the words of Senator Bell, "burglarize and
then viciously attack and wound or kill the people in [their]
houses."8
80. Fischer, supra note 10, at 66. Professor Fischer discusses the due process ramifica-
tions of ballot issues proposed by popular initiative. Although the Pennsylvania Constitution
does not provide for amendment by initiative, due process objections based on incomprehensi-
bility apply equally to legislatively proposed amendment propositions.
81. Grose v. Firestone, 422 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1982).
82. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 51.
84. Fischer, supra note 10, at 66-67.
85. 1983 PA. SENATE LEGIS. J. 198 (remarks of Sen. Bell). Senator Greenleaf pleaded:
"As every day goes by, there is the potentiality of additional defendants taking the stand and
On the other hand, a due process attack predicated on compre-
hensibility raises several difficulties. First, no practicable legal stan-
dard of comprehensibility now exists. ' Experts have developed vari-
ous readibility tests,87 but no court has attempted to equate any one
of them with due process. Even if a court did apply a particular test,
it would have to determine what degree of readibility or level of
comprehensibility satisfies due process, the most vague of constitu-
tional norms. Second, a comprehensibility attack on a proposed
amendment would require the court to adopt "a patronizing view of
popular abilities."88 Although many of the sacred "checks and bal-
ances" in the American governmental structure evolved from a
profound distrust of popular rule, American political theory still pro-
ceeds on the assumption that all power, including the judicial power,
ultimately emanates from the people.89 Third, a successful compre-
hensibility challenge might undermine the basic legal fiction that the
people understand the laws which define legitimate conduct. 90 Ulti-
mately, despite the extreme complexity of the voluntary confession
amendment, this kind of due process objection would probably fail.
2. Vested Rights Theory.-Another possible due process chal-
lenge arises from the "vested rights" theory. This theory provides
that once the state judiciary recognizes a certain level of protection
under the state bill of rights, a person acquires a constitutional right
to receive the same level of protection. 91 The vested rights approach,
however, imposes a doctrinal strait jacket on the states. 92 It assumes
that once the judiciary recognizes a right, the right becomes forever
walking out of the courtroom even though they are guilty." Id. at 197.
86. Fischer, supra note 10, at 67. "How is comprehensibility to be measured? Does due
process require that ballot propositions be drafted so they can be understood by the average
person with a sixth grade education? Should a person with a high school diploma be the stan-
dard?" Id.
87. For example, the Flesch Reading Ease Formula purports to measure readability
through reference to sentence length and average number of syllables per word. See R.
FLESCH. HOW TO WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH (1979); see also Ross, On Legalities and Linguistics:
Plain Language Legislation, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 329-39 (1981) (discussing readability stan-
dards, including the Flesch standards, used in plain language laws).
88. Fischer, supra note II, at 68.
89. "Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania '[a]ll power is in-
herent in the people.' . . . and no person nor branch of government has any more power than
is provided by that absolute framework of government." Shapp v. Butera, 22 Pa. Commw.
229, 233, 348 A.2d 910, 912 (1975) (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 2). Most state constitutions
expressly acknowledge "the people" as the ultimate authority. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. I
("all Government of right originates from the People"); N.J. CONST. art. 1, § I ("all political
power is inherent in the people"); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. IV ("the people ... have the sole
and exclusive right of governing themselves").
90. Anglo-American law is replete with legal aphorisms to this effect: ignorare legis est
lata culpa, that is "to be ignorant of the law is gross neglect"; ignorantia juris quod quisque
tenetur seire, neminem excusat, that is, "ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to
know, excuses no man." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (5th ed. 1979).
91. Fischer, supra note I1, at 69.
92. Id. at 72.
immune from legislative or popular reconsideration. Furthermore,
because the theory relies on the federal Due Process Clause, "it
would distort federal-state relations by giving the federal courts ulti-
mate control over revisions of state law any time a person arguably
affected by that revision claimed a vested right."93 Thus, a court
would not willingly declare a state constitutional amendment void
merely because the amendment frustrates a defendant's expectation
of constitutional protection.
In short, the voluntary confession amendment does not appear
to violate any provisions or theories of state or federal law. The ab-
sence of legal constraints, however, should not end the inquiry.
VI. Political Theories on the Propriety of the Voluntary Confession
Amendment
A. The Majoritarian Nature of State Constitutions
Differences between the federal and state constitutions in length
and specificity follow from the comparative ease with which, in every
state but one, a simple majority of the electorate can amend the
state charter.9" Amendment of the United States Constitution re-
quires approval by both houses of Congress and then by representa-
tive bodies in three-fourths of the states. 95 This decidedly anti-
majoritarian process has produced only twenty-six amendments in
nearly 200 years. Conversely, alteration of state constitutions is a
less arduous task, usually beginning by one of three methods: legisla-
tive proposal, provided for in every state charter; constitutional initi-
ative, provided for in seventeen charters; and constitutional conven-
tion, provided for in forty-one charters, but permitted in every
state.96 Under every amendment scheme but Delaware's, the ulti-
mate determination rests with the voters, who by a bare majority,
can approve the proposed changes.9 These permissive procedures
93. Id.
94. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note I, at 223-25. The constitutions of Delaware and
New Hampshire present the most antimajoritarian amendment schemes. In Delaware, pro-
posed amendments must receive the approval of two-thirds of two consecutive legislatures. The
electorate does not participate. DEL. CONST. XVI, § 1. In New Hampshire, proposed amend-
ments must receive the approval of two-thirds of the electorate. N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 100.
However, state constitutions in many aspects resemble statutory law more than they resemble
the lofty, immutable generalities of the federal constitution. "Both their susceptibility to revi-
sion in response to popular opinion and the wealth of content they characteristically encompass
encourage a view of state constitutions as integral parts of the democratic state governmental
processes, not as external constraints upon them." Developments in the Law-The Interpreta-
tion of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1353 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
95. U.S. CONST. art. V.
96. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 211.
97. See Developments, supra note 94, at 1354.
have fueled what one observer has termed as "amendomania." 9 As
a result, current state constitutions have undergone over 5000 altera-
tions collectively."9 Not surprisingly, these documents in many as-
pects reflect the will of the majority.
B. Special Status of State Bills of Rights .Within State
Constitutions
Despite the furious pace of "amendomania," state bills of rights
have undergone comparatively little revision.' Although voters oc-
casionally have tinkered with individual rights to reverse unpopular
court rulings, a good number of the changes in this area have ex-
panded rather than narrowed constitutional protections.10' Many
states, including Pennsylvania, have adopted amendments prohibit-
ing gender discrimination and guaranteeing a clean environment.1
0
2
Others have provided for the rights of handicapped persons, the right
to work or to bargain collectively, and the right to an education. 08
In both theory and practice, there is a difference between the
"general, great and essential principles of liberty" set forth in the
state bills of rights, and the more legislative-like provisions regulat-
ing such prosaic matters as taxation and municipal debt manage-
ment. Bills of rights exist, in essence, to protect all people, but par-
ticularly to protect the members of vulnerable minorities from
frequent and violent fluctuations of the majority will.' 04 They are the
fundamental law, and fundamental law, as one court noted long ago,
is not open to change "except in such particular and deliberate ways
as to render as certain as practicable that the electors desired it,
evidenced by an expression of judgment after ample time and facility
98. Comment, California's Constitutional Amendomania, I STAN. L. REV. 279 (1949)
(noting that between 1876 and 1946, a total of 439 amendments to the California Constitution
were proposed, of which 246 were ratified).
99. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note I, at 221.
100. See Developments, supra note 94, at 1354. Between 1980 and 1983, a total of 125
state constitutional amendments relating to finance and taxation were proposed. Of these, 80
were adopted. A total of 75 changes affecting legislative functions were proposed, of which 39
were adopted. Conversely, in the same period, only 26 amendments to the state Bill of Rights
were proposed, and 23 were adopted. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 216.
101. Generally, the expansion of constitutional protection has involved the recognition of
new rights rather than the modification of old ones. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, % 22
(right of privacy).
102. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 (gender); id. art. 1, § 27 (clean environment); ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 18 (gender); CALIF. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (same).
103. For a discussion of recent developments, see BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at
214-16.
104. See generally W. 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE (reprint ed. 1980)
("even the humblest of citizens has the same dignity before the law as the most powerful"
because "man is a child of God entitled to dignified treatment"); R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977) (American government predicated on theory that "men
have moral rights against the state"); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 4 (1979) (citing
cases).
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for investigation and maturity of thought on the subject. 10 5 In other
words, an amendment to the state charter should reflect "the sober
second thought"' 6 of the people.
Though the legislature followed the technical procedures in pro-
posing the voluntary confession amendment and the amendment re-
ceived the imprimatur of an electoral majority, the alteration of
long-established fundamental rights, so critical to the protection of
minority elements, deserved stricter scrutiny. Under article XI of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, the sole responsibility for initiation of the
amendment process lies with the general assembly, unless the people,
under some extraordinary circumstance, invoke their sovereign
power to call a convention.' But the Pennsylvania General Assem-
bly and all state legislatures have the duty to uphold the spirit, as
well as the letter, of the constitutional structure.10 8 Viewed in this
light, the general assembly appears to have acted improperly.
C. The Province of the Judiciary: The Theory of Separation of
Powers
The voluntary confession amendment encroaches upon the state
judiciary. As Chief Justice Marshall declared early on in Marbury v.
Madison,0 9 "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.""10 Since Marbury, the idea that
the courts serve as ultimate interpreter of the constitution has for the
most part become ingrained in both state and federal constitutional
law."' This assignment does not mean that the people cannot alter
their fundamental laws to reflect a viewpoint other than that of the
state judiciary. The courts, however, more than the people or the
legislatures, can best administer the specific application of general
constitutional norms. The very nature and structure of the judicial
branch make it the most appropriate interpreter of fundamental, an-
timajoritarian liberties.
105. State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 491, 137 N.W.2d 20, 22 (1912).
106. Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1, 15 (1912).
107. Although the Pennsylvania Constitution does not expressly provide for amendment
by constitutional convention, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has long recognized the legit-
imacy of conventions called by the people. See Taylor v. King, 284 Pa. 235, 130 A. 407
(1925); Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39 (1874).
108. This duty is at least implied in the oath of office to which every Pennsylvania legis-
lator, judge and state or county officer must subscribe: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
this Commonwealth and that I will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity." PA. CONST.
art. VI, § 3 (emphasis added).
109. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
110. Id. at 177.
Ill. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (quoting Marbury);
Zemprelli v. Daniels, 496 Pa. 247, 436 A.2d 1165 (1981) (decision as to whether claim
presents a nonjusticiable political question is responsibility of state supreme court, the "ulti-
mate interpreter of the Constitution").
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1. Courts as Legal Specialists.-Basically, courts are bodies
of legal experts. Most appellate level judges have had formal legal
training."' Moreover, the judicial atmosphere of the courtroom usu-
ally lends itself to thoughtful application of that training. Judges
must hear all sides of an argument, and in most cases they must
justify their decisions through some form of written opinion that sets
out the factual, legal and public policy ramifications of the contro-
versy. On the whole, the judicial mind tends to apply the law and
legal reasoning, rather than majoritarian politics, particularly in its
analysis of constitutional rights."' For this reason, one commentator
has characterized the United States Supreme Court as a "teacher in
an eternal national constitutional seminar."" 4
2. Impartiality.-Since the seventeenth century, when Sir
Francis Bacon lost his position as lord chancellor of England for re-
ceiving gifts from litigants,' 5 impartiality has become the hallmark
of the judicial branch of government."' Impartiality remains the sin-
gle quality that most clearly distinguishes a judicial proceeding from
a legislative or administrative proceeding." 7 A legislator can bring
into a legislative debate all the biases and prejudiced his constituents
will tolerate without tainting the lawmaking process in the least. In
fact, the framers of the American system of government intended
the legislative branch to accommodate the self-interested rivalries
that would inevitably arise in a pluralistic society."" But the judici-
ary operates under different conditions. For example, the procedural
aspects of due process mandate open, two-sided hearings with a ver-
batim transcript of the proceedings in most cases."' Additionally,
II 2. Every judge on the Pennsylvania Supreme, Superior and Commonwealth Courts
has a law degree. See DEPT. OF GEN. SERV., COMMW. OF PA., 1982-83 PA. MANUAL 418-24
(1983).
113. Of course, political influences do exist. See Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and
Judge's Decisions, in COMPARATIVE STATE POLITICS: A READER 392 (1971) (postulating that
party affiliation affects a judge's decisions).
114. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL PRO-
CESS 189 (4th ed. 1977).
115. R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 190 (1981).
116. Id. The author notes:
In elected politics, the legislature and the executive take idealistic, energetic, and
ambitious young men and turn them into whores in five years; the judiciary
takes good, old, tired, experienced whores and turns them into virgins in five
years . . . .The decisive factor is the institution-whether the exact same crea-
tures are quartered in the local house of ill fame or in the Temple of the Vestal
Virgins.
Id.
117. See, e.g., Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 66 A.2d
726 (1949) (distinguishing adjudicatory administrative proceedings from court proceedings:
impartiality a fundamental characteristic of a judge).
118. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison) 335-41 (Bicentennial ed. 1976)
(theories of bicameralism and separation of powers explained).
119. See R. NEELY, supra note 115, at 192-93; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (laying out the requirements of procedural due process).
ethical codes pervading both bench and bar forbid even elected
judges from "politicking" or speaking out on controversial issues. 2 0
In these detached and neutral tribunals members of "discrete and
insular minorities" can most readily obtain fair consideration of fun-
damental rights.
3. Separation of Powers.-The idea that the United States is
a democracy which champions democratic ideals pervades the popu-
lar political conscience,1 ' but pure democracy-in the sense of di-
rect government by the governed--does not and cannot exist in the
United States at any level of government.' 22 The founders of the
American political system feared the tyranny of an unfettered ma-
jority almost as much as the tyranny of an absolute monarch.'2
They established a multi-tiered system of representative government,
the diversity and size of which would frustrate the concentration of
power in any one person or group.' 24 As a further check on tyranni-
cal influences, they divided each of the two main levels of govern-
ment, national and state, into three coequal branches. Of the three,
the judicial branch performs the role most vulnerable to criticism: 25
custodian, conservator, and interpreter of fundamental principles
against the often short-sighted majoritarian process.
Thus, in the American political scheme, the majority cannot, or
at least should not, arrogate to itself the authority to determine the
scope of individual rights. Ronald Dworkin and other modern politi-
cal philosophers have refuted the argument that legislatures and
other democratic institutions possess some "special title" to make
constitutional decision:
One might say that the nature of this title is obvious, because it
is always fairer to allow a majority to decide any issue than a
120. See R. NEELY, supra note 115, at 194.
121. This idea is epitomized in Woodrow Wilson's declaration, on the eve of America's
entrance into World War I, that the world "must be made safe for democracy." J. BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 682 (E. Beck 15th ed. 1980). Similarly, Franklin Roosevelt urged, on
the eve of World War II, that America "must be the great arsenal of democracy." Id. at 780.
122. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4 guarantees "to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government." The United States Supreme Court has held that the determination of
whether a state government is republican in form is a political question for Congress, not the
courts, to decide. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1841); Pacific States Telephone &
Telegraph v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
123. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 46, 47. 48, 51 (J. Madison) (describing in de-
tail the structure and theory of American government under the United States Constitution).
125. Alexander Hamilton described the judiciary as the weakest branch of government:
The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direc-
tion either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but
merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments.
THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 504 (A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed. 1976) (emphasis in original).
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minority. But that, as has often been pointed out, ignores the
fact that decisions about rights against the majority are not is-
sues that in fairness ought to be left to the majority. Constitu-
tionalism-the theory that the majority must be restrained to
protect individual rights-may be a good or bad political theory,
but the United States has adopted that theory, and to make the
majority judge in its own cause seems inconsistent and unjust.
So principles of fairness seem to speak against, not for, the argu-
ment from democracy. 
26
These constitutional principles are not exclusively applicable on a
national level. When applied in the context of the voluntary confes-
sion amendment, they suggest that the General Assembly's adoption
of the proposal invaded the province of the state judiciary.
4. Political Accountability of State Judges.-Some commen-
tators have noted that state judges are less independent than their
life-tenured federal counterparts. 27 Most state judges must account
for themselves by some political process.12 8 Pennsylvania judges, for
example, hold their positions by popular election. 129 Thus, these com-
mentators believe that the state judiciary is as much a majoritarian
instrument as the legislature and is no better qualified than any
other political body to determine individual rights.
Yet, this argument ignores the essential constitutional role of
the judiciary as a body of dispassionate, impartial legal experts occu-
pying an independent and coequal branch of government. In this sys-
tem, the use of the amendment process to overrule the state supreme
court every time a specific application of the law offends the will of
the majority is even less justified' 30 because political accountability
eliminates the need to make minute alterations in a state bill of
rights. Moreover, if the decisions of the state judiciary truly offend
the collective sense of fairness and justice, the judges responsible for
those decisions will likely face defeat in the next election.
D. Preeminence of State-Guaranteed Fundamental Rights
In support of the voluntary confession amendment, Senator
Greenleaf relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's con-
126. DWORKIN, supra note 104, at 142.
127. See Developments, supra note 96, at 1351. Only three states approximate the fed-
eral model of judicial independence. Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire pro-
vide for life tenure and appointive selection. Id.
128. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note I, at 154-55.
129. PA. CONST. art. V, § 13. Justices and judges serve for terms of 10 years. They can
then run for subsequent terms in a nonpartisan retention election. Id. at § 15.
130. Several opponents of the amendment in the Pennsylvania Senate argued that legis-
latures should not overrule judges everytime they disagree on specific holdings. See supra notes
46 to 50 and accompanying text.
struction of the fifth amendment in Harris v. New York.131 The Sen-
ator correctly argued that the proposed amendment would bring
Pennsylvania in line with the Harris decision, 132 but he did not con-
sider that the privilege against self-incrimination under article I, sec-
tion 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution stands independent of the
privilege under the fifth amendment to the federal constitution. State
rights neither derive from nor depend upon the existence of federal
rights. Rather, they are founded on a set of common values underly-
ing the American system of government. Accordingly, careful pres-
ervation of these fundamental rights is as important at the state level
as it is at the federal level.
1. The Foundations of State Guarantees.-Both state and
federal constitutional rights evolved from a body of organic law hun-
dreds of years older than the Republic.1 33 In fact, the colonial char-
ters of William Penn, founder and first governor of Pennsylvania,
contained many of the procedural guarantees found in the modern
bills of rights.134 Pennsylvania's first independent constitution ex-
pressly recognized the privilege against self-incrimination, more than
fifteen years before the adoption of the fifth amendment.
135
Certainly, the framers of the federal constitution and the fed-
eral Bill of Rights understood the sovereignty of state-guaranteed
fundamental rights. Alexander Hamilton, among others, argued that
the existence of state protections made a federal Bill of Rights un-
necessary. 136 When critics objected to the proposed federal constitu-
tion on the ground that it lacked an enumeration of individual
rights,137 Hamilton observed that "a minute detail of particular
rights is certainly far less applicable to a constitution like that under
consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general polit-
ical interests of the nation, than to a [state] constitution which has
13 1. See 1981 PA. SENATE LEGIS. J. 790 (remarks of Sen. Greenleaf on the Harris deci-
sion); 1983 PA. SENATE LEDIS. J. 196-97 (same).
132. 1981 PA. SENATE LEGIS. J. 790 (remarks of Sen. Greenleaf).
133. Modern bills of rights have some antecedents in the Magna Carta itself, which the
barons of England exacted from King John in 1215. See generally A. HOWARD, THE ROAD
FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1968). Bernard
Schwartz has called the Magna Carta "the germ of the root principle that there are funda-
mental rights above the State, which the State-otherwise sovereign power that it is-may not
infringe." I B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 4 (1971).
134. See PA. FRAME OF GOV'T §§ V, VI, VIII, XI (1682) (guaranteeing right to public
trial, to plead through representatives, to a jury trial and to bail); PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES
§§ IV, V (1701) (guaranteeing a right similar to due process and right to call witnesses).
135. See PA. CONST. OF 1776 art. IX.
136. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 555-61 (A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed. 1976).
137. Thomas Jefferson was perhaps the most influential proponent of a bill of rights. In
a letter to James Madison on February 6, 1788, he observed that the absence of a bill of rights
in the proposed federal constitution was the proposal's "principal defect." 12 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 569 (J. Boyd ed. 1955).
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the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. ' ""
Members of the First Congress, including James Madison, worried
that an enumeration of federal rights might disparage those rights
which the people retained under state constitutions. 139 They there-
fore proposed what would become the ninth amendment to ensure, in
effect, that the state bills of rights would maintain their exalted
status.1'
2. The Renaissance of State Bills of Rights.-During the
1950s and '60s, the Warren Court's expansive view of individual
rights, particularly the rights of racial minorities" and of the ac-
cused,"12 inspired the swift rise of the federal Bill of Rights to para-
mount importance in American constitutional law. As a result, state
judges often rely exclusively on federal precedent to resolve constitu-
tional disputes arising in their courts.1 43 Recent changes in the Su-
preme Court's decision on individual rights, however, have sparked a
renaissance of state constitutional jurisprudence.'" States have
rediscovered the idea that their organic law can provide fundamental
protections against majoritarian abuse that rival or exceed those af-
forded by the federal government.14 5
3. The Need for Independent State Analysis.-Many com-
mentators," 6 including two Justices of the United States Supreme
Court," argue that the American constitutional system renders in-
dependent state analysis not only proper, but necessary. Concurring
in Massachusetts v. Upton,"48 Justice Stevens maintained that a
state court's failure to construe its own state constitutional guaran-
tees contravenes the ninth amendment, even though the state court
relies on equivalent guarantees in the federal constitution. In Upton,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had relied predominantly
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 559 (A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed. 1976).
139. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 133, at 1031.
140. Id. at 1027.
141. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial segregation);
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting rights); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. I (1967) (anti-miscegenation statutes); see generally B. BOZELL, THE WARREN
REVOLUTION (1966) (critical analysis of judicial policy-making).
142. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (search and seizure); Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 386 U.S. 436 (1966) (self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (right to counsel); see generally THE CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTER-
MATH: 1960-1974 (BNA 1975) (citing cases).
143. Brennan, supra note 22, at 490-91.
144. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 22.
146. See, e.g., Force, supra note 23 (state courts better able to protect individual rights);
Douglas, supra note 23 (state judge urges other state judges to apply state constitutional law
before applying federal constitutional law).
147. Justices Brennan and Stevens.
148. 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984).
on federal precedent and the fourth amendment guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure to overturn a criminal conviction.14 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed and, in a per curiam
decision, held that the Massachusetts court had misapplied federal
precedent. Justice Stevens found error not in the analysis of federal
law, but in the failure to apply state law. He noted that the Massa-
chusetts opinion nowhere indicated whether the search warrant in
question violated the Massachusetts search and seizure provision. 15 "
Thus, the state court, in violation of the ninth amendment, had dis-
paraged the rights retained by the people of Massachusetts under
the state constitution.1 5' According to Stevens, state judges must
first consider the state guarantee, and need only consider the federal
guarantee when the state affords no protection.5 2
The idea that the states may actually play a more important
role than the federal government in defining the scope and meaning
of fundamental rights receives support from the very structure of the
federal system. Charged with establishing fundamental law suitable
for nationwide application, the United States Supreme Court ana-
lyzes the federal Bill of Rights conservatively, focusing on minimal
guarantees for the most part. 53 Thus, the Court has shown some
sensitivity to the size and diversity of its jurisdiction 154 and to the
preservation of state integrity in the federal system. "
Conversely, the more homogenous jurisdiction and somewhat
lighter caseload of the state court permits a closer and more mean-
ingful analysis of basic rights. The Pennsylvania courts, for example,
can better apply on a case-by-case basis, the ancient principles of the
state's organic law as they have evolved from the original Penn char-
ters. State courts can experiment with specific applications of consti-
tutional principles without the concern for long-term bad effects that
would affect the entire nation.'5 6 Moreover, state judges rarely enjoy
149. In its interpretation of the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment,
the Massachusetts Court relied upon the approach set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983), however, the Court rejected this approach.
150. MASS. CoNsT. art. 14.
151. See, e.g., Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165 (1984) (written by Justice Linde of the Supreme Court of Oregon).
152. Justice Stevens concluded:
It must be remembered that for the first century of this nation's history, the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution of the United States was solely a protection for the
individual in relation to federal authorities. State constitutions protected the lib-
erties of the people of the several States from abuse by state authorities.
Upton, 104 S. Ct. at 2091 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Developments, supra note 94, at 1348-49.
154. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 n.1, 37 n.7 (1972); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961).
155. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. I, 41-44 (1973).
156. Developments, supra note 94, at 1397-98.
life tenure, permitting more frequent infusion of new blood into the
state judiciary. Thus, in addition to a greater knowledge of state law,
history, and tradition, state courts possess greater flexibility than
federal courts in the application of specific principles of constitu-
tional law.
E. Constitutional Characteristics: Generality and Permanency
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted over a century ago,
"a constitution is made, not particularly for the inspection of law-
yers, but for the inspection of the million, that they may read and
discern in it their rights and their duties; and it is consequently ex-
pressed in the terms that are most familiar to them.' 157 Codes and
statutes contain the kind of legalistic detail necessary to meet the
specific conditions of everyday life.' 58 Constitutions, on the other
hand, embody more permanent and general precepts. 159 They pro-
vide an element of stability against the impulses of bare majorities
and enunciate the general principles to which every person can turn
for guidance when new situations arise. 60
In some areas, of course, state constitutions do not conform to
the model. Constitutional language concerning taxation, state and lo-
cal finance, administrative agencies, electoral apportionment, and lo-
cal government resembles statutory language in its attention to de-
tail. 6 ' In these matters, for better or worse, state constitutions
require constant tinkering. Nonetheless, in Pennsylvania, as else-
where, the Declaration of Rights has always embodied "general,
great and essential principles of liberty and free government." This
generality ensures the flexibility necessary to meet ever-changing
conditions 62 and preserves the Declaration of Rights as an enduring
and respected guideline.
The voluntary confession amendment, however, represents an
attempt to fine-tune the language of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination. By littering the "great principles" with technical exceptions,
such amendments will diminish both the status and the purpose of
state-guaranteed rights. Furthermore, if the amendment merely re-
flects a swing to the political right in Pennsylvania, then individual
rights would appear to depend upon fad and fashion rather than ba-
157. Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Beamish, 309 Pa. 510, 514, 164 A. 615, 616
(1933) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101, 114 (1843)).
158. See generally 16 AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 3 (1979).
159. Id. §§ 4,5.
160. Id. § 4.
161. State constitutional language sometimes indulges in absurd amounts of detail. See,
e.g., OR. CoNsT. art. IX, § 8 (regulating the purchase of stationery used in state offices); ARIZ.
CoNsT. art. XXVI, § I (enumerating the kinds of documents real estate brokers can sign).
162. See Grad, The State Constitution. Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L.
REV. 928 (1968); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 7 (1979).
sic principles of justice. When the popular mood changes, as it inevi-
tably will, and the political pendulum swings in the opposite direc-
tion, the general assembly might again rewrite the fundamental law.
In the long run, the people and the courts will cease to rely on the
Declaration of Rights, and Pennsylvania constitutional jurisprudence
will again become subservient to the United States Supreme Court.
VII. Conclusion
Although the General Assembly breached no legal duty, it ulti-
mately appears to have abused political discretion granted to it by
the amendment provision of the state charter. Alexander Hamilton
once described the constitutional amendment process as a "solemn
and authoritative act."' 63 At the very least, it requires more far-
sightedness and concern for political minorities than legislators usu-
ally display in the ordinary course of their majority-bound
business. 64
Certainly the integrity of our political system depends upon the
preservation of certain basic rights, such as the privilege against self-
incrimination, to guard against the whims of popular passion. Legis-
lators, then, must exercise their critical role in the amendment pro-
cess with respect for the long-term purposes of constitutional govern-
ment. They must put aside political considerations that often
motivate their decision-making and concentrate on the interrelation-
ships between "the people," the courts, and the constitution. Electo-
ral ratification of a proposed amendment does not remedy a political
indiscretion on the part of the legislature, because the fundamental
rights involved, and the fundamental nature of the document itself,
transcend majoritarian politics. Even if electoral approval usually le-
gitimatizes otherwise errant acts, ratification of the voluntary confes-
sion amendment clearly lacked the full and meaningful participation
of Pennsylvania voters.165 In any event, an ill-considered, politically-
motivated adherence to the will of the majority will tip the constitu-
tional balance in favor of tyranny.
ANDREW E. FAUST
163. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 509 (A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed. 1976).
164. This is not to say that in the ordinary course of legislative business, legislators
should ignore the will of the majority. Actually, the legislatures exist in the American scheme
of government to reflect that will.
165. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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